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G331 
In the Supreme· Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
LAUREN W. GIBBS, INC., a cor, 
poration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. -~ 
E. E. MONSON, Secretary of State 
of the State of Utah, JOSEPH 
CHEZ, Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, and RULON F. No. 63 31 
STARLEY, State Bank Oommiss, 
ioner of the State of Utah, as mem, 
hers of the Securities Commission 
of the State of Utah, and the SE, 
CURITIES COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ~ 
Defendants and Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
HONORABLE ALLEN G. THURMAN, 
JUDGE. 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General of Utah, and 
DELBERT M. DRAPER, 
At. tome~ for Defendants a_._n_ d ·.A···. ppellants FLED 
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In the Supretne Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
LAUREN W. GIBBS, INC., a cor; 
poration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
E. E. MONSON, Secretary of State 
of the State of Utah, JOSEPH 
CHEZ, Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, and RULON F. No. 6331 
ST ARLEY, State Bank Commis~ 
sioner of the State of Utah, as mem~ 
bers of the Securities Commission 
of the State of Utah, and the SE~ 
CURITIES COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondent herein was registered as a dealer in securi~ 
ties for the year 1939 pursuant to Sec. 82~1~15 R. S. 1933 .. 
The Securities Commission, on November 18, 1939, 
revoked said registration pursuant to Sec. 8 2~ 1 ~ 21 R. S. 19 3 3. 
Thereafter, on December 18, 1939, respondent insti~ 
tuted an action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
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2 
Lake County by filing a Complaint against the Commission r.,. · · ~ 
and the members thereof, praying that the Court set aside 
the Order of Revocation made by the Commisssion, and that 
the Commission ""be required to return to this Court a 
transcript of the proceedings had before it * * *, together 
with a transcript of the evidence adduced at the hearing 
'* * *, within the time allowed by law for the defendants 
to answer the Complaint * * *, and for such other and 
further relief as rna y be proper in the premises." ~ II 
A Summons, in form prescribed for civil actions in 
District Courts, was serv•ed upon the Commission December 
18, 1939, and on the same day the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, without notice to the Commission of its intent 
to act, issued, ex parte, an Order requiring the Commission 
to ""return to the Court within twenty days from the date 
of service hereof, a full and complete transcript of the pro-
ceedings had by defendants * * *, and that pending the 
det•ermination of the cause and until the judgment of the 
Court beoomes final, the Order of defendants cancelling 
plaintiff's registration as a dealer in securities * * *, shall 
be suspended and the right of plaintiff to do business in the 
State of Utah as a licensed dealer shall continue.,, C~ t- J 
Thereafter, and within the time allowed to appear, the 
Commission challenged, by Demurrer and Motion, the suffi-
ciency of the Complaint and the jurisdiction of the Court to 
proceed in the manner in which it had proceeded and pro-
posed to proceed, and prayed that the Court vacate its 
unlawful Order suspending the Order of the Commission. (iJ..v 
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The Demurrer was over-ruled and the Motion was 
denied, and notice thereof was given defendants on January 
3, 1941. cu.- ~" 
Upon receipt of notioe of the Court's disposition of the 
Demurrer and Motion the Commission filed its notice of 
intention to stand on its Demurrer and Motion, and on the 
same day the Court entered its Judgment, January 4, 1941, 
setting aside and holding for naught the revocation order of 
the Commission. ~ _, '=- - J 
Thereafter, on January 1 5, 1941, defendants served and 
filed a Notice of Appeal, and on January 28, the Clerk o~ 
the District Court filed in this Court the Transcript on 
Appeal in the case, and thereafter, on the 29th day of Janu--
ary, 1941, appellants served and filed Assignments of Error as 
follows: ~ ~f ... J I 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
I. 
The Trial Court erred in making and entering its Order 
of December 18, 1939, in the following particulars: 
1. It suspended an Order of the Securities Commission 
dated November 18, 1939, on mere motion of respondent's 
Counsel, ex parte, without notice to appellants, and without 
affording appellants an opportunity oo be heard. 
2. It authorized respondent to continue to do business 
as a licensed dealer in securities, pending final determination 
by the Court of the action instituted by respondent. 
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3. It failed to require a bond or other security from 
respondent pending such final determination by the Court. 
All of which acts and omissions were contrary to law, 
and the plain provisions of Chapter 1, Title 82, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 19 3 3. 
II. 
The Trial Court erred in denying appellants' Motion 
for an Order to set aside its Suspending Order of December 
18, 1939. 
III. 
The Trial Court erred in the exercise of its discretion, 
if it had discretion, and clearly abused such discretion with 
respect to matters stated in Assignments I and II herein. 
IV. 
The Trial Court erred in over.-rtiling appellants' Demur-
rer to respondent, s Amended Complaint on file in said cause. 
v. 
The Trial Court erred in making and entering its final 
Judgment in said cause setting aside and holding for naught 
the said Order of the Securities Commission dated November 
18, 1939, for the reason that said Judgment is contrary to 
law. 
The questions raised by each Assignment of Error may 
be discussed in the order in which the assignments appear 
above. 
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ASSIGNMENT I. ARGUMENT 
1. Had the District Court jurisdiction to suspend the 
Revocation Order of the Securities Commission ex parte, 
without notice to the Commission, and without affording 
the Commission an opportunity to be heard? 
The answer must be No; for the reason that the Legis .. 
lature of Utah has declared that the business of selling 
securities, and dealers in securities, shall be regulated. It has 
set up standards and rules of regulation and has vested in 
the Securities Commission of Utah the sole duty of adrninis .. 
tering the law with respect thereto,-Title 82, Chap. 1, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
It may be argued that the Courts share this responsi .. 
bility with the Commission by reason of Sec. 8 2 .. 1 -41. This 
position cannot be sustained because neither a Commission 
nor the Courts had a~_thority to license dealers in securities 
before the passage of the Securities Act, and a fortiori, neither 
had authority to revoke a license. 1\.fter the Act was passed 
the Commission was given such authority, subject to court 
control. L. 25. Chap. 87, Sec. 19. But in 1933, the control 
of the court was limited by Sec. 82 .. 1 .. 41-supra. No word, 
phrase or sentence in the Act as amended, can be construed to 
show a legislative intent to give the Courts power to license, 
suspend, or revoke licenses of dealers in securities. Oourts 
must find and follow the legislative intent. This Court tersely 
enunciated such doctrine in a very recent case,-· Golding vs. 
Schubach Optical Company, 93 Utah, 32, 70 Pac. (2d) 871. 
Speaking of regulating Optometrists the Court said: 
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Hit matters not whether optometry be regarded 
as a "learned profession' or not. It is a "licensed pro-
fession,, or trade, which had no regulation until the 
Legislature acted and set up standards· and regula~ 
tions. The Legislature having so acted, the Court 
cannot go beyond what the Legislature has done. 
We are not concerned with what the regulations or 
limitations should be. That argument must be ad~ 
dressed to the Legislature. We are only concerned 
with what the Legislature has said; how far have they 
gone?, 
Applying this test to the regulation of dealers in se, 
curities, let us see what the Legislature has said with respect 
to the Court, s authority to issue, suspend, or revoke dealers, 
licenses. The law as now written is found in Sec. 82.-1.-41, 
which reads as follows: 
""Any person directly affected and aggrieved by 
any final order of the Commission made under any 
of the provisions of this title may, within 30 days 
after notice of such order, institute an action in the 
district court of the county at the seat of government 
against the Commission, setting out his grievance 
and right to complain. In its answer the commission 
may set out any matter in justification; and the court 
shall determine the issues on both questions of law 
and fact, and may affirm, set aside or modify the 
order complained of., 
For emphasis, we repeat that before the passage of the 
1925 law, the Courts had no power to issue, suspend, or 
revoke dealers, licenses, and a reading of Section 8 2.-1.-41 
shows no such power granted now. It is not even intimated. 
On the contrary, there is conclusive proof that the legislature 
intended to relieve the Court of such responsibility by the 
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amendment aforesaid. It may now initiate nothing itself 
with respect to licensing. It may not even disturb what the 
Commission has done except after a complaint filed, answer 
made, and Hissues on both questions of law and fact" are 
determined by the Court. 
Yet in this case the Court suspended an order of the 
Commission, with nothing but a oomplaint before it, and 
without a single issue made, and without an opportunity 
afforded the Commission to answer and make an issue. In 
view of the Statute the conduct of the Court was both un--
lawful and high--handed. Union Trans. Co. vs. Bassett 118 
Cal. 604, 50 P. 754; Doble etc. Corp. vs. Daugherty (Cal.) 
232 P. 140. 
2. But the Court was not content tJo merely suspend 
the Order of the Commission. It went further, and· author--
ized the plaintiff to continue as a Hlicensed dealer" pending 
final determination of the case, notwithstanding the only 
body authorized to revoke a license had revoked it, and not--
withstanding Sec. 8 2--1--1 5 of the Securities Act, which 
provides: 
HEvery registration under this section shall ex-
pire on the 31st day of December in each year." 
The Court's suspension order was made December 18th, 
19 3 9, and its final determination of the issues was made 
and entered January 4, 1941, so that the plaintiff operated 
as a licensed dealer, by Court Order, in three distinct license 
years oontrary to plain legislative mandate. If the Suspen--
sion Order was high--handed, this was little short of con--
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tumacious. It could not even be excused on the ground 
that the Court believed the whole Act to be unconstitutional 
for the reason that if the Act is unconstitutional the Court 
is stripped of power to make any orders of any kind respect" 
ing the licensing of dealers. 
3. Assuming that the Court had authority to suspend 
the Commission's Order and the authority to issue a license 
to the dealer pending its determination of issues, had it the 
authority to do so without requiring a bond from the dealer 
to insure proper conduct by the dealer pending such deter" 
mination? 
Again, this would depend upon the Legislative intent. 
On this point the Securities Act is silent, but the Legislature 
has created many other boards and commissions, and with 
respect to orders to be made by them it has not been unmind" 
ful that the status of such orders pending Court review is 
important. Scripps.-Howard Radio et al. vs. Fed. Communi" 
cations Comm. U.S. Ct. of App. D. C. Decided Feb. 3, 1941, 
-Fed. 2nd-. Fed. Communications Comm. vs. Pottsville 
Bdctg. Co., 309 U. S. 134. 
With respect to the Board of Agriculture, it provided 
that the license should remai:n in effect until the end of the 
license period, or until final determination of Court pro" 
ceedings, whichever is first in point of time. Laws of Utah, 
193S', Chap. 4, Sec. 17. 
With respect to the Aeronautic Commission, it provid.-
ed: ~~The district court may in its discretion determine 
whether the filing of the praecipe shall act as a supersedeas.,, 
Laws of Utah, 1937, Chap. 10, Sec. 17. 
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With respect to the Public Service Commission it pro-
vided: HThe Commission shall be served· with process * * * 
which shall operate to stay all proceedings pending the de.-
cision of the district oourt, during which pendency the com.-
mission shall grant the applicant a temporary permit to op,. 
erate as a contract carrier." Laws of Utah, 1935, Chap. 65, 
Sec. 9. 
With respect to Contractors under the Board of Regis.-
tration, it provided for an appeal to the district court like 
an appeal from a justice's court, and gave the Court the 
power to suspend or canoe! licenses after a hearing. Laws 
of Utah, 1933, Chap. 58, Sec. 6. 
With respect to Board of Registration, controlling the 
licensing of about 20 trades and professions, the Insurance 
Commission and the Securities Commission, nothing was 
said with respect to supersedeas, stays, or bonds. What, 
then, did the Legislature intend by such omission? 
The most natural and ·logical conclusion is that it in" 
tended the orders of such bodies to stand until £ound unlawful 
by a Court of competent jurisdiction. If it intended any,. 
thing else it could have said so as it did in the case of other 
licensing bodies. 
If, upon any consideration of law or equity, it could 
be said that the Court has authority to reinstate a revoked 
license, the same consideration would lead to the conclusion 
that the dealer should be required to give bond for the pro,. 
tection of the public, since the Legislature must have thought 
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that he ought not to practice his business or profession at all 
during pendency of the Court action. 
ASSIGNMENT II. ARGUMENT. 
For reasons set forth under Assignment I, it appears 
that the Court erred in denying appellants' Motion to vacate 
its Suspending Order of December 18, 1939. 
ASSIGNMENT III. ARGUMENT. 
Assignment III is also disposed of by the facts and con~ 
elusions set forth under the discussion of Assignment I. 
ARGUMENT. ASSIGNMENT IV. 
GENERAL DEMURRER 
Should appellants' Demurrer to respondent's Complaint 
have been sustained? 
We answer in the affirmative, because all the well 
pleaded facts set forth in the said Complaint state no reme~ 
dial grievance, but on the contrary they constitute a justifi~ 
cation of the Order complained of. What constitutes well 
pleaded facts is tersely stated in the case of Montana Amuse~ 
ments Company vs. Goldwyn, 182 Pac. 121, as follows: 
HA demurrer only admits facts well pleaded; it 
does not admit matters of inference and argument 
however clearly stated; it does not admit, for example, 
the accuracy of an alleged construction of an instru-
ment, when the instrument is set forth in the bill, or 
a copy is annexed, against a construction required by 
its terms, nor the correctness of the ascription of a 
purpose to the parties when not justified by the 
language used. The several averments of the plaintiff 
in the bill as to his understanding of his rights, and 
of the liabilities and duties of others under the con .. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
tract can, therefore, exert no influence upon the mind 
of the Court in the disposition of the demurrer. 
Dillon vs. Barnard, 21 Wall 437; 22 L. Ed. 673." 
··courts will not read into a pleading a substan-
tive allegation which has been omitted therefrom. 
Substance is just as essential under the Code as at 
common law. Where '* * * attack is made upon 
a complaint for want of substantial allegations, the 
Court should indulge, as against the pleader, the 
presumption that he has stated his cause of action 
as strongly as he can, and construe it accordingly. 
Conrad National Bank vs. G. N. Railway, 24 Mont. 
182, 61 Pac. 3." 
With these principles in mind, we may now proceed 
to examine the Complaint paragraph by paragraph, to de.-
termine whether a cause of action is stated. 
Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 allege the capacity of the parties, 
and raise no issue. 
Paragraph 4 sets forth an Order to the respondent to 
Show Cause before the Commission why its registration 
should not be cancelled for allegedly having engaged in a 
practice of the sale of securities, which is fraudulent and 
in violation of law, and allegedly having demonstrated its 
unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer in securities. 
Respondent complains that this is not .. information in writ" 
ing, or information concerning the . nature of the wrongs 
committed. But in paragraphs 7 and 11 respondent aUeges 
that it was furnished a Bill of Particulars and an Amended 
Bill of Particulars concerning said wrongs, thereby negativing 
its allegation that it was not furnished information in writing, 
both in general and specific terms, concerning the alleged 
wrongs. 
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In paragraphs 8 and 11 respondent alleges that the Bill 
of Particulars and the amended Bill of Particulars ··wholly 
failed to set forth facts sufficient to support or sustain in 
anywise the said information served upon plaintiff" as al~ 
leged in paragraph 4. 
This is not an allegation of fact at all. It is the pleader's 
conclusion and cannot overcome the presumption that the 
Bill of Particulars was sufficient. Inland Steel vs. N .L.R.B. 
105 Fed. 246. Thus we have not only the pleader's bare 
conclusions, but the unconscious statement of a fallacy as 
well. A parallel instance may be found in Kansas Gas & 
Electric Co. vs. Comm., 122 Kan. 462, 251 Pac. 1097. In 
that case the aggrieved party brought an action in Court 
praying that an order of a commission granting a competing 
company a license, or certificate of convenience and necessity 
to operate in a described district, be set aside and enjoined, 
on the ground that the order was arbitrary, unlawful and 
unreasonable ""for the reason that no evidence whatever was 
introduced before said commission which would justify or 
support its order or finding." 
In support of its contention the ""aggrieved party" out~ 
lined the proceedings had before the commission ··and other 
more or less pertinent facts in detail", which on its face 
sh'?wed that proper issues had been raised before the com~ 
mission followed by the introduction of competent evidence 
on the issues, and findings and an order. 
The Commission, and the company receiving the license, 
demurred to the Complaint of the aggrieved party and the 
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13 
demurrer was sustained. It was sustained for the following 
reasons: 
1. That the allegations that the conduct of the Com .. 
mission was arbitrary, unlawful and unreasonable was a 
mere conclusion of the pleader and a paralogism. 
2. That the allegation in the Complaint to the effect 
that no evidence whatever was introduced to justify or 
support the Commission, s order or finding was negatived by 
an allegation in the Complaint stating that at the hearing 
before the Commission ~~evidence was introduced (by appli .. 
cant) in support of its said petition, and by these plaintiffs 
(protestants) in opposition thereto, and said hearing was 
closed and the matter taken under advisement., 
Reference to the Complaint of the aggrieved party in 
the case at bar discloses the following grievances: 
1. That the Securities Act is unconstitutional. 
2. That the charges made by the Commission against 
the aggrieved party were insufficient. 
3. That the hearing was not conducted lawfully. 
4. That the aggrieved party is innocent. 
We purpose to show, as we go along, that each of these 
grievances is negatived by the allegations of the Complaint, 
except the first, which will be shown to be untrue as a matter 
of law. 
With respect to the sufficiency of the charges it is now 
too well settled to admit of argument that: 
HThe requirements of a complaint before the 
department charging unprofessional conduct, even 
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on direct attack, are not as exacting nor are the in~ 
gredients of the charged misconduct required to be 
as formally or as specifically stated as in a criminal 
or civil proceeding where the offense involved in the 
charge is the basis of the action.,, State vs. Cragun, 
81 Utah, 457, 20 P (2nd) 247. 
It is equally well established that ""The Code provisions 
do not govern procedure before public quasi~judicial bodies, 
such as the Public Service Commission, the Industrial Com~ 
mission, or the like.,, McCarty vs. Public Service Commis~ 
sian, 94 Utah, 304, 77 Pac. (2d) 331; Meffert vs. Packer, 
66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 2 7, which later case was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of the United States; 195 U.S. 62 5, 49 
L. ed. 350, 25 Sup. Court Rep. 790. 
Charges filed against a licensee with the Commission, 
or charges laid by the Commission itself, must be sufficient 
""to challenge the attention of the board, and notify" the 
licensee ""of the nature of the charges made against him." 
Meffert vs. Packer, supra. 
It may be oonceded that a notice to a licensee to appear 
before the Commission ""and show cause why your license 
should not be revoked,,, without more, would be insufficient, 
but it is not so clear that the following notice is insufficient: 
""That the said Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc., . . . 
through one or more of its officers or directors has 
been guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with 
the sale of certain securities and has demonstrated 
its unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer 
in securities within the State of Utah."" 
This charge is in the language of our statute, and it is 
admittedly general. But, as we shall show hereafter, charges 
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sometimes can be made only in general language. As said 
in a note to the Meffert case found in 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 811: 
'The power exercised and the object of its exer .. 
cise are in each case identical, viz: to exclude an 
incompetent or unworthy person from the practice 
of medicine.,, 
The purpose of sub--section 4 of Section 82--1 .. 21 (Utah 
Statute) is the same. It provides that a dealer's license may 
be canoelled if he 
.. Has demonstrated his unworthiness to transact 
the business of dealer." (Italics supplied) .. In the 
very nature of the subject theve must be lodged 
somewhere a personal discretion for determining who 
are unworthy." 66 C.J. 63. 
Under a Kansas statute, quoted below, the Medical 
Board proceeded as follows: 
Kansas Statute: 
.. The board may refuse to grant a certificate to 
any person guilty of gross immorality or addicted to 
the liquor or drug habit to such a degree as to render 
him unfit to practice medicine or surgery; and may, 
after notice and hearing, revoke the license for like 
cause." 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 814. 
Dr. Meffert was accused of being grossly immoral under 
this statute and his license was revoked. The Complaint 
served upon him contained a charge of gross immorality 
supported by exhibits as follows: 
( 1) A resolution passed by the Board of Edu .. 
cation of .the City of Emporia, discharging one of its 
female teachers for associating with him; (2) a state .. 
ment .. that he was a man notorious in Emporia for 
his immorality"; ( 3) a request signed by 18 practic .. 
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ing physicians and surgeons of Emporia, stating that 
""we have grounds to believe that he is grossly im-
moral, and vvoe know that he is guilty of other unpPO" 
fessional conduct of such a degree that we will not 
meet in consultation or recognize him as a member 
of the medical profession,,; ( 4) a request signed by 
the Pastors of 9 of the Churches of Emporia; ( 5') 
another signed by 38 business men of Emporia each 
stating that Meffert was grossly immoral, and asking 
that his license to practice be revoked; ( 6) an affi .. 
davit of 0. M. Wilhite charging Meffert with numer,. 
ous acts unprofessional, grossly immoral and criminal. 
Respecting this ""information in writing, the Court said: 
""These charges, while not as formal or specific 
as would be required in an information or an indict" 
ment, were ample to challenge the attention of the 
board, and to notify the plaintiff in error of the 
nature of the charg·es made against him.,, 1 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 814. 
Respecting the whole investigation the Court said: 
""The provisions of the Act creating the board 
plainly indicate that such investigation was not in" 
tended to be carried on in observance of the technical 
rules adopted by courts of law ... and to require 
of a board thus composed that its investigations be 
conducted in conformity to the technical rules of a 
common law court would at once disqualify it from 
making any investigation., 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 816. 
The samoe doctrine was announced by this court in the 
case of State vs. Cragun, 81 Utah, 45'7, 20 P. (2d) 247. 
While the attack made on the Order of Revocation in that 
case was collateral, and not direct, yet the court said: 
""The requirements of a complaint before the 
department charging unprofessional conduct, even on 
direct attack, are not as exacting nor are the ingredi, 
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ents of the charged misconduct required to be as 
formally or as specifically stated as in a criminal or 
civil proceeding where the offense involved in the 
charge is the basis of the action.,, 
But whether the notice, set forth in paragraph 4 of the 
Complaint in the case at bar, is held to be sufficient or not, 
the whole Complaint shows beyond doubt that the charge 
in that notice was fully amplified by a Bill of Particulars 
which was served 35 days before the hearing. The hearing 
began on September 27, 1939 (see paragraph 10 of the Com--
plaint) and according to paragraph 8 of the Complaint the 
plaintiff was served with a Bill of Particulars on August 22, 
1939. The Findings of Fact, which are made a part of the 
Complaint, show 18 sp~cific findings of fact, based on docu--
mentary evidence, oral testimony and stipulations of the 
parties, and that a hearing was had beginning August 27th 
""and continued thereafter on set dates through the 21st day 
of October, 1939." So that it could not be supposed that 
the respondent was not informed of details of the wrongs 
charged against it or that it was without opportunity to pre--
pare a defense. This is emphasized by the fact that respondent 
entered into stipulations at the hearing, which became a basis 
for the findings, as shown by the complaint. 
Paragraph 5 sets forth the Commission's suspension Or--
der and paragraph 6 complains that said Order was illegal 
and void and failed to state facts sufficient to justify the sus--
pensiOn. 
The Statute, Section 82--1--21, provides that: 
~~Pending the hearing the Commission shall have 
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power to order the suspension of such dealer's regis-
tration, and such order shall state the cause for such 
suspension., 
The respondent was plainly informed that the reason 
for temporary suspension was that ""one or more of its of~ 
ficers or directors has been guilty of a fraudulent act in the 
sale of certain securities and has demonstrated its unworthi~ 
ness to transact the business of dealer in securities." It 
seems quite unnecessary to labor the point that this was a 
sufficient statement of cause for temporary suspension. Even 
Courts of Law in such cases go no further than to say, Hand 
good cause appearing therefor." 
Obviously the statement of cause in such order is not 
the complaint upon which the case is to be heard, and so no 
reason appears, in law or in equity, for detailing all the ulti~ 
mate facts to be proved on hearing. 
However, any question respecting the temporary sus~ 
pension order had become moot when the case reached the 
District Court. The Show Cause Order had been ampli~ 
fied by a Bill of Particulars, the respondent had been given 
35' days to prepare its defense, a full hearing was had at 
which respondent was represented by able Counsel, and a 
final Order of Cancellation had been made based upon an 
adequate set of Findings of Fact in writing, which super~ 
seded the Suspension Order, and left nothing to review but 
the final Order of Oancellat.ion, all of which appears upon 
the face of the Complaint. 
Paragraph 7 of the Complaint alleges that the Bill of 
Particulars served on respondent made appellants, the plain .. 
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tiffs, prosecuoors, and Court all combined in one tribunal and 
deprived respondent of due process of law under the State 
and Federal constitutions. 
There is some ambiguity in this allegation. Just how 
the Bill of Particulars did this is not apparent. It has often 
been charged, in State and Federal actions, that administra .. 
tive boards act as plaintiffs, prosecutors and court all in 
one, but probably no case can be found where a Bill of 
Particulars cast those roles upon them. 
However that may be, administrative boards are not 
courts, and their acts cannot be tested by reference to judi.-
cial codes.-McCarty vs. Comm., supra. 
This Court went on record in 1895 as to what consti .. 
tutes ~~due process" in an administrative hearing and it has 
not changed its position since. At that early date there was 
a Utah statute which provided that: 
~~The board of medical examiners may refuse to 
issue the certificates provided for in this Act to indi .. 
viduals guilty of unprofessional or dishonorable con .. 
duct, the nature of which shall be stated in writing, 
and it may revoke such certificates for like causes, to 
be stated in writing." (Quoted from People vs. Has .. 
brouck, 11 Utah, 291 at page 300; 39 Pac. 918, at 
page 920.) 
The statute made it a misdemeanor to practice medicine 
without a license. Notwithstanding this statute, one Dr. 
Hasbrouck did practice without a license for which he was 
haled before Commissioner Harmel Pratt, found guilty, and 
fined $50.00 
The case was appealed to the Third District Court and 
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was tried on an agreed statement of facts, where the de· 
fendant was again found guilty and fined $50.00. 
The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The:Pe the sufficiency of the Complaint seems to have been 
qustioned but the Court disposed of the point by saying: 
""Upon the question whether the Complaint is 
sufficient in form the authorities are somewhat in 
conflict; but it is not necessary to pass upon that 
question., 
But upon the question of whether the regulatory statute 
deprived the defendant of ""due process," the Court said: 
""That legislation of the general character en· 
acted in this statute-namely, legislation to protect 
the community against the effects of ignorance and 
incapacity, as well as deception and fraud, in the 
practice of medicine, by requiring a certain degree 
of learning and skill upon the part of the practitioner, 
~ascertained upon an examination by competent per• 
sons, or inferred from a certificate in the form of a 
diploma or license from an institution established 
for instruction on the subject,'-is a legitimate exer• 
cise of the police power of the state, and that depriv· 
ing persons not so qualified of the right to practice 
is not obnoxious to the inhibition of the f·ederal con-
stitution against the deprivation of pvoperty without 
due process of law, are propositions which are thor· 
oughly settled." 11 Utah, 302; 39 Pac. 920. 
At the same time this Court also set at rest the question 
of conferring judicial power upon an administrative body in 
the following language: 
""The objection that the statute attempts to con· 
fer judicial power on the board is not well founded. 
Many executive officers, even those who are spoken 
of as purely ministerial officers, act judiciously in 
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the determination of facts in the performance of their 
official duties; and in so doing they do not exercise 
~judicial power,, as that phrase is commonly used, 
and as it is used in the organic act, in conferring 
judicial power upon specified courts. The powers 
conferred on the board of medical examiners are no 
wise different in character in this respect from those 
exercised by the examiners of candidates to teach in 
our public schools, or by tax assessors or boards of 
equalization in determining, for purposes of taxation, 
the value of property. The ascertainment and de--
termination of qualifications to practice medicine by 
a board of competent experts, appointed for that 
purpose, is not the exercise of a power which ap--
propriately belongs to the judicial department of 
the government. It does not trench upon the judi--
cial power." 11 Utah, 305; 39 Pac. 921. 
In the leading case of Meffert v. Packer, supra, Counsel 
for the State of Kansas, cited the foregoing Utah case in 
support of this proposition: 
""The element of good character is a pre--requi ... 
site to the right to practice medicine. That has been 
the fixed policy of the law makers of the country." 
1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 814. 
In the same leading case the Court cited said Utah case 
in support of this proposition: 
""The power of the State to provide for the 
general welfare of its people authorizes it to pvescribe 
all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure, 
or tend to secure, them against the consequences of 
ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and 
fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the 
practice of different states, from time immemorial, 
to exact in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and 
learning," upon which the community may confidently 
rely." 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 815. 
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Such statutes are not unconstitutional because power 
is conferred upon administrativ•e bodies in general terms. 
HThe rule obtaining in the majority of the juris~ 
dictions which have passed on the question is that a 
statute providing that the license of a physician, sur~ 
geon or dentist may be revoked by the officers or 
board by. which licenses are granted, is not rendered 
uncertain or otherwise invalid because the grounds 
for revocation ar•e therein stated in general terms.,, 
Note, 5 A. L. R. 94 
The case of Baker vs. Dept., 78 Utah, 424, 3 Pac. (2d) 
1082 is cited as coming under this rule. Note, 79 A. L. R., 
327. 
In this connection we point out that the statute in 
question in People vs. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah, 300; 39 Pac. 
· 920, provided for revocation under the general terms Hun~ 
professional or dishonorable conduct," notwithstanding 
which the statute was, by this Court, held to be valid. 
Full discussion of ""Permissible limits or delegation of 
legislative power" may be found in an extensive note in 79 
L ed. 474. On the separation of governmental power and 
the delegation thevoof, the basic rule for guidance is stated 
thus: 
HThe theory of the distribution of governmental 
functions is certainly as old as Aristotle (Politics, 
bk. 6, chap. 11, 1), and has been a controlling prin" 
ciple and accepted doctrine of political sdence since 
it was elaborated by Montesquieu in his Spirit of 
Laws. The belief in its importance was never stvong~ 
er than during the latter part of thoe century, when 
our national Constitution was formed and the gov~ 
ernment established. See 1 Bl. Com. 146, 154 (Ham~ 
mond's ed. pp. 362, 371); 2 Woolsey, Pol. Sci. p. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
259; Maine, Pop, Gov. 219; Montesquieu, Spirit of 
Laws (Nugent's Trans.) bk. 11, chap. 6; The Fed· 
eralist, Nos. 4 7, 48, 51. But the founders were too 
intensely practical to be controlled by any political 
theory, and, while they recognized the principle in 
constructing the framework of the government, they 
violated it in practice and so distributed the powers 
as to create a system of checks and balances. See 
Mason, Veta Power. The principle formulated by 
Mon~esquieu still lies at the base of most political 
organiz;ations of the present day, but during the last 
century the tendency of political science has been to 
discard it in its extreme form, because, as said by 
Goodnow: •It is incapable of accurate statement, and 
because it seems to be impossible to apply it with 
beneficial results in the formation of any concrete 
political organization. The flaw in Montesquieu's 
reasoning and in that of his followers was in the as .. 
sumption that the expressions of the governmental 
power by different authorities were different pow.-
ers.' Goodnow, Adm. Law, 20, 21. The recent 
tendency of legislatures and courts is commented on 
by Justice Brown in State ex rel. Jonason vs. Crosby 
(1904) 92 Minn. 176, 99 N. W. 636. The present 
attitude of the courts towards questions arising under 
this constitutional provision is well expressed by the 
supreme court of North Carolina: ·while ... the 
executive, legislative, and supreme judicial powers 
of the government ought to be forever separate and 
distinct, it is also true that the science of gov•emment 
is a practical one. Therefore, while each should 
firmly maintain the essential powers belonging to it, 
it cannot be forgotten that the three co.-ordinate 
parts constitute one brotherhood, whose common 
trust requires a mutual toleration of the occupancy 
of what seems to be a H oommon because of vicinage, 
bordering on the domains of each., Brown vs. Tur-
ner (1874) 70 N.C. 93, 102. It is well to recognize 
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the fact that "there are a multitude of governmental 
duties which have never been and cannot possibly be 
performed either by the legislature or by the gover~ 
nor, and which are certainly not prescribed by the 
Constitution to the judiciary.' State, Paul, Prose~ 
cutor, vs. Circuit Judge (1888) 50 N.J. L. 585,611, 
1 5 A. 2 72, 1 L. R. A. 86; Bluntschli, Theory of the 
State, chap. 7. The constitutional provision has no 
application to acts of this character. It applies only 
to the powers which, because of their nature, are as~ 
signed by the Constitution itself uo one of the depart~ 
ments exclusively. Ross vs. Essex County (1903) 
69 N.J. L. 291, 55 A. 310; Eckert vs. Perth Amboy 
& W. R. Co. (1904) 66 N.J. Eq. 437, 57 A. 438. 
The powers not thus assigned remain properly under 
the control of the legislature. As said by Black; 
"There may be cases in which a particular power 
cannot be said to be either executive, legislative, or 
judicial; and if such a power is not by the Oonstitu~ 
tion unequivocally intrusted to either the executive 
or judicial departments of the government, the mode 
of its exercise and the agency must necessarily be de~ 
termined by law; that is, by the legislature.' Black, 
Canst. Law, 74. See also Cooley, Canst. Lim. 2d 
·ed. 42, 43; McClain, Canst. Law in United States, 
Sec. 24; Bridges vs. Shallcross (1873) 6 W.Va. 562, 
Field vs. People (1839) 3 Ill. 79; People ex rei. Le 
Roy vs. Hurlbut (1871) 24 Mich. 44, 63, 9 Am. 
Rep. 103." 79 L. Ed. 477. 
As a guide uo determine whether an unlawful delegation 
of power has been made it is said: 
""The long practice of the legislature in delegat~ 
ing certain powers, and the universal acceptance and 
acquiescence of the bar and the courts in the consti~ 
tutionality of such delegation, will be given much 
weight by the court in determining the validity of 
such delegation. It was stated by the Supreme Court 
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that the fact that Congress had frequently, from the 
organization of the government to the present time, 
in numerous instances related by the court, conferred 
upon the President certain powers with reference to 
trade and commerce, was entitled to great weight in 
determining the question whether such a delegation 
was unconstitutional, and that such practical con--
struction should not be overruled unless the legisla--
tion was clearly incompatible with the Constitution." 
79 L. Ed. 487. 
The Utah legislature has long indulged in the delegation 
of power to regulate professions, trades and callings, so that 
it may be said that a basis has been provided from which to 
conclude that Utah's administrative laws are constitutional. 
The majority of the Courts, both State and Federal, 
entertain no doubt about the delegation of powers, so com--
monly made to boards and commissions, and so the conclu--
sion follows that the constitutionality of ~~Blue Sky, laws 
is pretty generally set at rest. Such being the case it will be 
helpful to learn how such laws are interpreted. In the case 
of Guaranty Mortgage Co. vs. Wilcox, 62 Utah 184, 218 
Pac. 133, 30 A. L. R. 1324, this Court assumed, without 
deciding, the constitutionality of the Utah HBlue Sky" law 
and respecting its interpretation said: 
.. In this connection we desire to add here that 
we are not unmindful of counsel's contention that, in 
view of the very drastic penalties that are imposed by 
law, and of the consequences that may be visited even 
upon innocent persons in case the provisions of the 
law are violated, the law should receive a strict con--
struction. The penalties are indeed drastic and the 
consequences harsh, but that, standing alone, does 
not authorize us to •except transactions that are clear--
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ly within both the spirit and the letter of the law, as 
well as within the mischief the law was intended to 
meet. Nor have we overlooked the fact that a too 
liberal construction and application of the ""Blue Sky 
Law, may defeat its own purpose, in that it may 
interfere with legitimate transactions, and may thus, 
through such undue interference, become harmful, 
rather than a shield to protect the unwary from 
fraudulent stock transactions, as well as from trans~ 
actions in unsecured bonds, securities, etc., as is 
manifestly the purpose of the law. In view, how~ 
ever, that the validity of the law is not assailed, and 
the transaction here in question comes squarely with~ 
in the terms of the law, we have no alternative save 
to enforce the law as written., 30 A. L. R. 1330. 
Assuming now, as we think the Court must, that the 
provisions of the Securities Act, under consideration in the 
case at bar, are constitutional, it follows that they must be 
enforced as written. And as written, it app~ars that appel~ 
lants in this case followed these provisions with a precision 
commendable for a mere administrativ·e body which was not 
required to follow the refinements of technical judicial code 
proceedings. 
In paragnaph 9 respondent complains that appellants 
failed to disclose who was the Securities Commission's in-
formant and that it failed to confront respondent with such 
informant at the hearing, ··contrary to law and to the due 
process clause of the Federal and State Constitutions.,, 
It was not the duty of the Commission to disclose the 
name of any particular informant or to produce and con~ 
front the respondent with such informant at the hearing. 
Such a duty is consonant only with certain aspects of crimi~ 
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nal actions. Even an attorney in a disbarment proceeding 
before a Court would not be entitled to be conf11onted by 
any particular witness or informant. This is clearly shown 
'"In Re Bumette"-Kan.-85 Pac. 575. 
In that case the Trial Court '"excluded important depo~ 
sitions taken against the defendant, holding that the accused 
had the right to meet the witnesses face to faoe." 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of ~ansas said: 
""Such is not the law ( 4 Cyc. 915) "-85 Pac. 
577. 
In addition ro the authority given for this holding, the 
Court announced the following rules and principles: 
•• An ·action, is an ordinary proceeding by which 
a party prosecutes another for the enforcement or 
protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a 
wrong, or the punishment of a public offense . . . 
Every remedy other than a:n action is a special pro~ 
ceeding ... It is sufficient to say, with the Legisla~ 
ture, that the remedy of disbarment is a special pr~ 
ceding." 85 Pac. 576~7. 
The Court further said: 
""It leads to confusion to call the proceeding 
criminal. This oonfusion is nowise clarified by using 
the hybrid expression ·quasi~ criminal.' It involves an 
ancient fallacy to give a thing a name, and then at~ 
tempt to prove its attributes by that name." 85 Pac. 
576. 
From the foregoing it appears clear that respondent's 
grievance about not being confronted with a complaining 
witness, or not having such witness made known, arises from 
the belief that the special proceeding before the Securities 
Commission was a criminal or ""quasi~criminal" action. This 
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would not be so even if the charges laid for cancellation of 
respondent, s license had involved crime, as stated by the 
~ansas Court: 
""Proceedings to disbar an attorney on account 
10f criminal conduct connected with the practice of 
his profession are wholly independent of any prose~ 
cution for crime. The proceeding to disbar is not 
for punishment of the derelict attorney, but for the 
protection of the courts, the legal professi10n, and the 
administration of justice generally." 85 Pac. 576. 
The purpose for the control of the sale of securities is 
stated to be, by the Supreme Court of Utah in the quota~ 
tions from. Guaranty M10rtgage Co. vs. Wilcox, supra, .. to 
protect the unwary from fraudulent stock transactions, as 
well as from transactions in unsecured bonds, securities, etc., 
To protect the public in such transactions, the Securi~ 
ties Commission has the right to purge its rolls of persons 
guilty of misconduct even though it involves disgrace and 
destroys a means of making a living. In doing so the Com~ 
mission would in nowise be engaged in criminal prosecution. 
In Re Burnette, 85 Pac. 576. 
Par.aghaphs 10 .cvnd 12 involve no controversial matter, 
and paragraph 11 is disposed of above. 
Paragraph 12a we shall qu10te in full. It reads: 
''That the defendants are wholly without juris~ 
diction to enter their final order of cancellation dated 
November 18, 1939, as aforesaid, or at all, for the 
reason and upon the grounds that all of the transac~ 
tions therein mentioned pertain to securities expressly 
exempted by law, to-wit, municipal bonds, and con~ 
trary to and in violati10n of Section 29, Article 6 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and constitute 
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an isolated transaction expressly exempted from the 
defendants' jurisdiction by law." 
These allegations are unintelligible because it cannot be 
told therefrom, first, what said transactions are exempt from, 
second, what is contrary to and in violation of ArticLe 6, 
Section 29 of the Constitution, and third, how .. all of the 
transactions therein mentioned" can constitute an ""isolated 
transaction." 
If by the first is meant to be said that municipal bonds 
are exempt from registration, we admit it. If it is meant to 
be said that a registered dealer is exempt from regulation in 
transactions involving municipal bonds, we cite Sections 
82-1~15, 21, 24 and 28 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as 
a complete refutation of the allegation. These sections pr~ 
vide as follows: 
Section 15: .. No dealer or salesman shall en~ 
gage in business in this State as such dealer or sales~ 
man, or sell any securities, including securities ex~ 
empted in Section 82~1~5, except in transactions 
exempt under Section 82~ 1~6, unless he has been reg~ 
istered as a dealer or salesman in the office of the 
Commission pursuant to the provisions of this sec~ 
tion." 
Section 21: ""Registration under Sections 82~1~ 
1 5 and 82~ 1 ~ 17 may be refused, or any registrtaion 
granted may be canceled, by the Commission, if after 
a reasonable notice and a hearing the Commission de~ 
termines that such applicant or registrant so regis~ 
tered: 
( 1) Has violated any provision of this chapter 
or any regulation made hereunder; or, 
( 2) Has made a material false statement in the 
application for registration; or, 
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( 3) Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in con~ 
nection with any sale of securities, or has been or is 
engaged, or is about to engage, in making fictitious 
or pretended sales or purchases of any securities, or 
has been or is engaged, or is about to engage, in any 
practice or sale of securities which is fraudulent or 
in violation of law; or, 
( 4) Has demonstrated his unworthiness to 
transact the business of dealer, salesman or agent; or, 
( 5) Is insolvent. 
Pending the hearing the Commission shall have 
the power to order the suspension of such dealer's, 
salesman's or agent's registration, and such order 
shall state the cause for such suspension. 
In the event the Commission determines to re-
fuse or to cancel a registration as hereinabove pro~ 
vided, it shall enter a final order to that effect with 
its findings on the register of dealers and salesmen. 
It shall be sufficient cause for refusal or cancel~ 
lation of registration in case of a partnership, or of a 
corporation or unincorporated association, if any 
member of the partnership, or any officer or director 
of the corporation or association, has been guilty of 
any act or omission which would be cause for refus~ 
ing or cancelin&,the registration of an individual deal~ 
er or salesman. 
Section 24: ""Whenever in the issuance, sale, 
promotion, negotiation, advertisement or distribution 
of any securities within this State, including any se~ 
curity exempted under the provisions of Section 82~ 1~ 
5, or in any transaction exempted under the pr~ 
visions of Section 82~ 1 ~6, any person, as defined in 
this chapter, shall have employed or employs or is 
about to emp1oy any device, schem•e or artifice to de~ 
fraud," etc .... ""the Commission may investigate, 
and whenever it shall believe from evidence satisfac~ 
tory to it that any such person has engaged in . 
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it may in additi-on to any other remedies bring an 
action . . . ,, (Italics supplied.) 
Section 28 makes false advertising a felony 
which the Commission could, under the terms of the 
Act, make a ground for revocation without institut .. 
ing a criminal proceeding. 
If by the second it is meant to be said that the Commis ... 
sian may not interfere with municipal affairs we point out 
that there is no allegation in the whole Complaint charging 
that the Commission has so interfered. Nothing but the 
conduct of the dealer is in question. 
If by the third it is meant to be said that all the trans" 
actions detailed in the Findings of Fact constitute an isolated 
transaction, we call attention to the fact that respondent al.-
leges more than an isolated transaction by alleging Hall of the 
transactions, mentioned in the final Order. And further, 
upon reading the Findings, which are part of the Complaint, 
a multitude of transactions appear. Here, again, we have 
the paralogism described in Kansas Gas vs. Comm., supra. 
'The amendment to the Complaint, added (as 12c), as .. 
sails Title 82, Chap. 1, Section 21, and particularly sub-
section 4 thereof, as in violation of the due process clauses of 
the State and Federal Constitutions and as an unwarranted 
delegation of legislative powers. We have given attention 
to ··due process, and ••delegation, features above, ::tnd, 
therefore, shall look here at sub.-section 4 only, since it is 
particularly designated. 
This sub.-section provides that a dealer's license may be 
cancelled if he ••has demonstrated his unworthiness to trans ... 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
act the business of dealer, salesman or agent." Similiar pr<Y 
visions may be found in many statutes regulating professions, 
trades and callings, and the Courts have found no difficulty 
in finding them constitutional. We call attention to the note 
appended to Meffert vs. Packer, supra, wherein the annota--
tor says: 
""The power exercised and the object of its exer--
cise are in each case identical, viz: to exclude an 
incompetent or unworthy person from the practice of 
medicine." Note to Meffert vs. Packer, supra, 1 L. 
R. A. (N. S.) 811. 
Delegating ro a Commission the duty of weeding out 
the unwor.thy without defining the term is not uncommon. 
Upon this subject we read from 66 C. J. 63 as follows: 
""As used in statute, what qualities, or lack of 
qualities, should render one "unworthy' would be 
difficult for legislative enum•eration; they are so 
numePous, and their combinations so varied in differ--
ent individuals, that a statute which undertakes to be 
more specific would either be incomplete, or so 
varied, or so inflexible as to defeat the ends sought. 
In the very nature of the subject there must be lodged 
somewhere a personal discretion for determining 
who are "unworthy'." 
Courts have defined the term ""worthy" so that it is well 
understood by all. See in Re Hastings Estate, (Nev.) 160 
Pac. 782; Alsup vs. State, 238 S. W. 667; Marrs vs. Mat--
thews (Tex.) 270 S. W. 586. 
The terms ""worthy" and ""unworthy" are no loess cap--
able of definite definition than ""moral" and ""immoral," 
""honorable" and ""dishonorable," ""competent" and ""incom--
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petent," ··careful" and .. careless," and all of these words have 
been used and upheld in statutes delegating to Commissions 
the duty to find their presence or absence in determining the 
qualifications of those seeking, .. or having licenses,,, to prac-
tice in various professions, trades, and callings, and that with-
out any definition to guide the Commissions other than the 
definition generally recognized by the Courts . 
.. To particularize, a State may delegate not only 
the powers of determining an applicanfs intellectual 
fitness and educational qualifications, but also his 
moral fitness; or the power may be broad enough to 
cover the general fitness of the applicant. In case of 
a:n applicanfs grievance because of some act of such 
a board or because of its failure to act, the remedy is 
not against the delegation of power but against its 
proper exercise, and is available by means of a proper 
proceeding against the board.,, Y oshizawa vs. Hewitt, 
52 Fed. (2nd} 411; 79 A. L. R. 317 at 320 and 322. 
Paragraph 12b alleges a strange and unusual grievance, 
to~wit, the Commission made a transcript of its proceedings, 
but in spite of frequent, formal demands it refused to give 
plaintiff a full copy thereof. 
The Commission is not required by law to make a 
transcript of proceedings. Any notes it made of evidence 
received would be the same as notes on evidence made by. 
a judge on the bench. If the judge had his notes transcribed, 
it is hardly thinkable that a party to the action could demand, 
as a matter of right, a full copy of his transcript, or any at 
all. 
Let it be assumed that the Commission was required 
by law ro make a transcript, still a party would not b( en--
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titled to a copy unless he tendered to the Commission the 
cost of making one. There is no allegation that Respondent 
tendered such costs for a transcript, so in any •event its griev.-
ance is without merit. 
Pargraph 13 alleges ""that the plaintiff has been in.-
formed ... that the Commission had before it at the time 
of its determination a complete transcript of the evidence 
adduced by the Commission but had not transcribed and did 
not have before it in transcribed form the evidence adduced 
by plaintiff.,, 
Respondent seems to think that it has a right to know 
by what prooess of reasoning or action the Commission ar.-
rived at its decision, but this is not the law. 
""The policy against requiring public disclosure 
by judges or jurors of their reasoning and actions in 
arriving at a decision or verdict applies as well to the 
judicial function of an administrative board., Botany 
Worsted Mills vs. N. L. R. B. 106 Fed. (2d) 263, 
Syllabus 1. 
Pa1iagraphs 14 Vo 18 inc., allege the making and serving 
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and assail both 
as contrary to law. Neither, it is complained, is supported 
by the issues raised by the Order to Show Cause, the Order 
of Suspension, the Bill of Particulars, or the Amended Bill 
of Particulars, and both ar•e outside the issue raised therein. 
In answer to this, we point out again that neither the 
Bill of Particulars nor the Amended Bill of Particulars is 
set forth in the Complaint although they were served on 
Respondent and, therefore, were in its possession. Absent 
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their appearance in the Complaint, or an allegation of a ma" 
terial fact wherein they were defective, it must be presumed 
that they were sufficient for all purposes. The presumption 
that the acts of the board were regular must be indulged. 
Inland Steel vs. N. L. R. B., 105 Fed. (2d) 246. 
But the grievance is not good as against what actually 
does appear in the Complaint. To illustrate: The Findings 
show that the respondent agreed Hto use their best efforts to 
extend or refund" certain water and electric light bonds of 
Mount Pleasant City, Hor any part thereof.'' Finding 3. 
Some of the things respondent did after such agree-
ment follow: 
(a) It proceeded Hto provide the necessary refunding 
bond blanks, together with all necessary proceedings by 
Mount Pleasant City in the issuance of said bonds, including 
an Attorney's opinion approving the legality of said refund, 
ing bonds.,, Finding 5. 
(b) Among the necessary proceedings prepared by 
respondent, as found above, was a resolution which was 
passed by said City, s Council as follows: 
HWhereas the owners of said bonds have offered to 
accept refunding bonds of said Mount Pleasant City in 
exchange for their present holding of $2 5,000 Mount Pleas.-
ant bonds and accept said refunding bonds at a lower rate 
of interest.,, Finding 6. 
(c) The owners of the outstanding bonds had not 
agreed to accept refunding bonds at a lower rate of interest, 
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or at all, but on the contrary respondent had bought there, 
funding bonds under an exchange agreement. Finding 7. 
(d) Instead of exchanging the refunding bonds for 
original outstanding bonds respondent got possession of the 
refunding bonds and sold $22,000, par value, of them to 
the State Land Board of Utah for $28,485.22, and this 
without taking up a single outstanding original bond, and 
without accounting, or delivering, to Mount Pleasant City 
the $28,485.22 received. Findings 8 and 18. 
(e) Respondent pursued a similar course with respect 
to $15,000 worth of the City's electric light bonds. Finding 9. 
Without detailing, specifically, the remainder of the 18 
Findings, suffice it to say that they show a multiplicity of 
transactions, and not an isolated transaction, and a course of 
dealing that fully supports the conclusions that the respon.-
dent misled and engineered the City into an unlawful posi, 
tion; that it was guilty of misrepresentations, that it jeopar.-
dized the taxpayers of the City and the interests of two 
departments ot' State and the interests of the holders of the 
original oustanding bonds, and generally conducted itself in 
an unworthy manner. 
P.aragraph 19 of the Complaint raises no issue. 
Paragraph 20 alleges a conclusion of the pleader that 
respondent was entitled to have a full and complete trans, 
cript of pPoceedings before the Commission sent down for 
revi•ew by the Court to the end that the final order of the 
Commission might be set aside and revoked. The Commis.-
sion is not required to make a full record of its proceedings 
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and therefore it cannot be required to make a full transcript 
thereof to be used by the Court. This point will receive 
further attention under our argument on special demurrer, 
infra. 
Paragraph 21 alleges that ""plaintiff herein has com .. 
mitted no act in the sale, purchase, or exchange of securities, 
either of commission or omission, which in anywise justifies 
or sustains the final Order of Cancellation." 
The Commission found otherwise, and there is no 
allegation of lack of evidence, on this point to sustain the 
finding. 
Paragraph 22 alleges that the Attorney General con .. 
ceded that there was no charge of actual fraud and no evi .. 
dence of actual fraud, but ""at most it might be considered 
constructive fraud,, and that he admitted the evidence 
adduced shows no fraud or intent to defraud. 
This allegation raises no substantial issue. The Attar .. 
ney General sat as a member of the Commission, and any 
.remarks made by him would be no more binding on the 
Commission than the remarks of a single judge, in a three 
judge trial court, would be upon such court. But whatever 
their effect the Attorney General's remarks did not exclude 
the idea of fraud. Constructive fraud may be as damning as 
actual fraud. 
Paragraph 23, the last paragraph in the complaint, 
alleges that ~~municipal bonds are expressly exempted under 
the State Securities Act and can be issued, sold or otherwise 
dealt in without registration or license as a dealer first had 
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and obtained." We have discussed a similiar ambiguous 
allegation under paragraph 12a, but will repeat part of the 
discussion here. 
If the foregoing allegation is divided into its component 
clauses, it would read as follows: 
(a) ""Municipal bonds are expressly exempt~ 
ed" by law. 
(b) ""Municipal bonds can be issued, sold or 
otherwise dealt in without registration or 
license as a dealer first had and ob~ 
tained." 
Thus divided the meaninglessness of the allegation ap~ 
pears. If respondent meant to allege that municipal bonds 
are exempt from registration, we admit it, but if he meant 
to allege that a dealer in such bonds may go unregistered 
and unregulated, we appeal to the Act for complete refu~ 
tation. 
Having examined every allegation in the Complaint, 
well pleaded or •otherwise, and having found no grievance 
stated that entitles respondent to any relief, we submit, under 
Assignment of Error IV, the Court should have sustained 
appellants' General Demurrer. 
ARGUMENT ASSIGNMENT IV 
SPECIAL DEMURRER 
Appellants, by Special Demurrer, sought to compel 
amendment of the Complaint to make it conform to some 
procedure consonant with Sec. 82-1~41, Revised Statutes, 
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1933. We believe that appellants were entitled to as much, 
and we further believe that if the statute has any meaning at 
all, its provisions must be complied with. 
Certainly courts may not depart from the provisions 
of a statute conferring power upon them. 
~!he extent and nature of a power depend upon 
the terms in which it is conferred, and it will not be 
enlarged because exercised by courts clothed with 
general jurisdiction; and a judgment by a tribunal 
without authority, or which exceeds or lies beyond 
its authority, is necessarily void." Hampshire vs. 
Woolley, 72 Utah, 106, 269 Pac. 135 at 138. 
It is our contention that although the Third Judicial 
District Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and 
parties in the case, it was prooeding in an unauthorized man .. 
ner, from which course it should have desisted, particularly, 
when so advised. 
~~Person's rights and relief to which he may be 
entitled ar~e based on and measured by established 
rules of law and procedure, and though court may 
have jurisdiction over subject matter and parties, 
judgment or decree may be void, because procedure 
employed by court was such that court was not 
authorized to exert its power in that way." Hamp.-
shire vs. Woolley, supra, Syl. 1. 
The language of 82.-1.-41, con£erring power upon the 
court, sets forth, in terms too plain to permit of construction, 
the right of a party, affected and aggrieved by an order of 
the Securities Commission to state his grievance and right 
to complain, in an action instituted in the court. Of necessity 
his grievance would be confined to the wrongful, unlawful, 
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or oppressive manner in which the order was arrived at or 
made. His grievance could not be, for instance, that he just 
did not liiDe it, and would prefer to have the court's judgment 
in the matter, because Sec. 82~1~41 oonfers no power upon 
the court to substitute its judgment for that of the Commis~ 
sion. 
""A controversy like this always calls for fresh 
reminder that courts must not substitute their notions 
of expediency and fairness for those which have 
guided the agencies to whom the formulation and 
execution of policy have been entrusted." Ry. Comm. 
vs. Rowan, 84 L. ed. 1373 (1939}. 
Under 82~1~41 the court ""may affirm, set aside o1 
modify the order complained of," but it is given no authority 
to set up its own independent judgment. 
""It shall determine the issues on both questions 
of law and fact." 
This can mean no other than the issues of law and fact 
raised by the complaint of the aggrieved party and the 
answer of the Commission, and not the i"sJes of fact raised 
by the Show Cause Order and charges of the Commission. 
There is a clear and a wide distinction between the two situ, 
ations which we shall illustrate later. 
Sections 82 .. 1 .. 41, 79 .. 1-36, .1nd 43 .. 2 .. 17, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, are alike and they provide the 
manner in which practically all licensees in the professions, 
trades and callings in the State may resort to the Courts to 
air their grievances against boards and commissions. None 
of these sections have been construed by this Court and 
hence the importance of this appeal. 
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It is our contention that these sections are reasonably 
clear as to the procedure intended to be follewed in such 
cases. It is safe to assume that the Legislature intended to 
establish a simple, direct, and effective Hresort" to the courts 
and not some flock.-shot, hybrid, or ambiguous procedure. 
There is nothing therein to indicate that a trial de novo, 
as in an appeal from a Justice's Court, was intended. (See 
Baker vs. Dept., 78 Utah, 424, 3 Pac. (2d) 1082). If such 
an action. was intended, then respondent failed to follow the 
procedure as defined by the Court in the case just cited. 
Likewise, it would seem that a Htrial de novo on the 
record" was not intended, because the Commission is not 
required to keep a record of testimony taken at its hearings. 
The procedure most comformable to the foregoing sec" 
tions is an action H in the nature of a suit to set aside the 
action of a public service body,, as suggested by this Court 
in D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co. vs. Comm., 98 Utah, 431; 100 
Pac. (2d} 552. 
The State of Kansas has a statute almost identical with 
our Sections 82.-1.-41, 79.-1.-36, and 43 .. 2 .. 17. The Supreme 
Court of Kansas has held that the procedure indicated by 
such statute is in the nature of an action to set aside the 
action of a public service body. Kansas Gas & E. Co. vs. 
Comm., 122 Kan. 462, 251 Pac. 1097; Atchison, etc. Ry. 
Co. vs. Oomm., 130 Kan. 777, 288 Pac. 755. This Court, 
in D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., vs. Comm., supra, refused to 
apply this construction to Sec. 9 of Chap. 35, Laws of Utah, 
19 3 5, because it was different from the Kansas statute. No 
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subsbtantial difference, however, exists between the Kansas 
statute and our sections 82.-1.-41, 79.-1.-36, and 43.-2.-17. 
The pertinent part of the Kansas Statute reads as 
follows: 
"" ... within thirty days from the making of 
such order, commence an action in a court of compe.-
tent jurisdiction, against the public utilities commis.-
sion as defendant, to vacate and set aside any such 
order, finding or decision of the public utilities com-
mission . . . and such action shall be tried and de.-
termined as other civil actions." 
The pertinent part of the Utah statute reads: 
"" . . . within thirty days after notice of such 
order, institute an action in the district court . . . 
setting out his grievance and right oo complain. 
In its answer the commission may set out any matter 
in justification; and the court shall determine the 
issues on both questions of law and fact, and may 
affirm, set aside or modify the order complained of." 
The Kansas statute requires a new complaint in the 
court by the aggrieved party, an answer by the commission 
and a trial on the issues of both law and fact made by such 
complaint and answer, and not a trial on the issues raised 
before the Commission. (See Kansas Gas etc. vs. Comm., 
supra.) 
In a later Kansas case, Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. 
Comm., supra, the aggrieved party complained that the 
Commission had granted a license; or certificate of conveni; 
ence and necessity, to a transportation company to operate 
a motor bus line, without sufficient evidence to justify the 
granting of such certificate. In support of the Complaint 
a compLete transcript of all the evidence received by the 
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Commission was attached to the Complaint, and a claim 
and request for a judicial review of the law and the facts 
was made, because of insufficiency of facts amounting to 
"absolutely no evidence to support the order of the com.-
mission," as shown by the transcript. 
The Commission filed an Answer, and the Court, over 
the objection of the plaintiff, refused to weigh the evidence 
in the transcript, but proceeded ro try th~ case on the issues 
raised by the complaint and answer filed in the Court, and 
not the issues raised by the complaint and answer before the 
Commission. 
Among the rights tried and issues raised were: 
(a} May the Commission make an order based on 
absolutely no evidence? This was resolved in 
the negative. 
(b) Were letters and opinions competent· evidence 
before the Commission? On this point the 
Court quoted another Kansas decision which 
held that 44SO long as a judicial hearing de novo 
is provided, it is not very important just what 
sort of evidence is received by the Commission." 
(c) Was there any evidence before the Commission 
which would support its Order? 
Answer: Yes. 
(d) May a court substitute its judgment for that of 
a oommission based on competent evidence? 
Answer: ~ 4Time and time again the Court in 
consonance with the prevailing attitude of 
courts throughout the country, has declared that 
it will not substitute its judgment for that of 
some administrative tribunal created by legisla.-
tive authority for dealing with matters of non.-
judicial character.,, 
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The Utah statute specifically provides how far a co1.:rt 
may go in this respect. It may affirm. It may revers~ if 
th~.; aggrieved party's ""rights involved in the hearing before 
the Commission" have been violated. And it may modify 
the Commission's order for like reasons. But it may not set 
up its own judgment as to what relief the competent evidence 
receiv,ed by the Commission entitles the aggrieved party. 
Such seems to be clear legislative intent. Our statute 
does not say, nor does it reasonably imply, that courts shall 
have the ultimate authority to determine who. shall be per-
mitted to practice the business of selling securities, or practice 
any other calling, trade, or profession, because the authority 
is given, in terms, to a commission by Section 8 2-1-41, and 
like statutes. 
It may, however, be readily inferred therefrom that the 
aggrieved party may have his day in Court to test thee. 
validity of the law under which the Commission operates, to 
insure •• due pPocess, in its hearings, to prevent captiousness 
and oppression, and all like matters, but the language of the 
statute is too plain to question that the legislature intended 
the Commission, and not the Courts, to administer the law 
and to pass upon the fitness and conduct of licensees. 
In the case at bar, the aggrieved party was largely right 
in the course it pursued, but it got mixed up. It was per-
missible, for instance, to complain that the Commission's 
Order was based on a void statute; that its Findings were not 
within the issues, and like matters. 
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Respondent might, also, have complained that the Com" 
mission's Order was not supported by any evidence at all, if 
it thought it could prove the allegation, but it did not. Yet 
it demanded that a full and complete transcript of the evi ... 
dence be filed with the Court, for no reason at all, that can 
be imagined, other than it wished the Court to substitute its 
judgment, for that of the Commission, on the weight of the 
evidence. 
There is not even a charge in the Complaint that the 
evidence received by the Commission was insufficient to 
support its Order. Such being the case, the absurdity of 
requiring a transcript of the evidence is starkly apparent. 
In the Atchison case, supra, the plaintiff produced a 
full and complete transcript of the evidence, to prove its 
allegation that such evidence did not support the findings and 
order. The Court refused to weigh the evidence or to make 
any conclusion of its own as to what order should have 
been made. That function, it held, belonged to the Com ... 
mission. 
There is very little of the judicial function involved in 
granting or withholding of licenses to practice a profession, 
trade or calling. It is largely an administrative matter. In 
the utility field, boards are authorized to issue licenses to 
operate, and in addition they are authorized to l!egulate 
service and rates. ""In the exercise of the latter powers, the 
lawful scope of the Commission's orders is hedged about by 
statutory and unconstitutional guarantees and inhibitions. In 
granting or withholding of certificates of convenience, no 
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justiciable questions touching confiscation of property or 
impairment of vested rights can well arise." Kan. Gas etc. 
vs. Comms., supra. 
If, then, it may be said that the Kansas ""resort to courts 
statute," supra, contemplates only a testing of the lawfulness 
of the Commission's procedure where only the licensing 
feature is involved, then of necessity it must be concluded 
that the Utah statutes, supra, contemplate no more because 
nothing more than mere licensing is involved in the Utah 
statut•es. 
In the Kansas case last quoted above the Court said: 
""In determining whether such certificate of con.-
venience (license) should be granted, the public con~ 
venience ought to be the Commission's primary 
concern, . . . the desires and solicitations of the 
applicant (are) a rdatively minor consideration." 
(Bracketed words added.) Quoted from 2 51 Pac. 
1099. 
From the foregoing it is easy to see why a Kansas Court 
might open the doors a little wider to new evidence under its 
statute than a Utah Court would under its similar statutes. 
The Kansas statute covers the utility field while the Utah 
statutes cover pure licensing in the fields of professional, 
trade and business callings. But even a Kansas Court, where 
nothing but the license itself is involved, as in the Kansas 
Gas case, supra, hews to the line and tests only the lawfulness 
of the Commission's orders. 
We are unable to find any substantial difference be, 
tween the Kansas and Utah laws in this respect. It might 
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be contended that a difference exists in the following two 
clauses of the statutes; Kansas: HSuch action shall be tried 
and determined as other civil actions." Utah: HThe Court 
shall determine· the issues on both questions of law and fact, 
and may affirm, set aside, or modify the order complained 
of.n 
We see no difference in results that may be obtained 
under either of these clauses. Obviously in a trial to set 
aside a judgment, resulting in a refusal by the Court, such 
refusal 'WOuld be the equivalent of affirming the Commis-
sion's Order. If good cause appeared therefor, the Court 
could modify the Order, pursuant to its equity powers. 
A good example of a case for modification may be found 
in Lees vs. Freeman, 19 Utah, 481, 57 Pac. 411. There the 
action was against I. E. and J. J. Freeman. Upon conclusion 
of the trial the Court ordered judgment against J. J. Freeman 
in the sum of $456.71 and for I. E. Freeman no cause of 
action. Thereafter, judgment was entered against both of 
the defendants for $485.59, for no reason that appeared in 
the record. I. E. Freeman filed a petition tJo modify the 
judgment, but it was filed after the statutory time. Not" 
withstanding this, the Court, after hearing, modified the judg-
ment. From the modifying order plaintiff appealed to this 
Court where it was held that the lower Court had lost juris" 
diction under the statute to modify, but it took occasion to 
say: 
Hln a case such as presented here, a bill in equity 
is the proper remedy by which all the parties may be 
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brought before the Court, and where issues may be 
regularly joined and tried on all the facts connected 
with the transaction." 
In cases like the one at bar, a plaintiff has the same 
remedy afforded by statute, whether it be in Kansas or Utah. 
The merit of the remedy thus provided against unlawful, 
fraudulent, or oppressive acts of licensing agencies is that it is 
simple, direct, and adequate. Any other· construction of the 
statute would lead to a more complicated and costly proce~ 
dure, which is persuasive evidence that the legislature intend~ 
ed that the language of the statute should be understood in 
its usual and normal sense, to say nothing of the effect of 
dropping Sec. 19 L. 2;. 
In construing the numerous and varied Hresort, 
statutes, Courts all over the country have often referred to 
proceedings thereunder as trial de novo. This has led to 
some confusion. But a careful examination of these cases 
shows that there may be trials de novo in appeal courts as if 
the case originated there; trials Hde novo on the record,, as 
in equity appeals (see D. & R. G. W. Ry., supra), and trials 
de novo on the rights involved in a hearing or trial. It is 
this latter type of trial that is contemplated by Sec. 82~ 1 ~41, 
supra. It is described by the Supreme Court of Kansas as 
follows: 
Hit is not an appeal, neither is it one for review 
of the former hearing, but it is an application to a 
judicial tribunal for a trial de novo of the rights. 
involved in the hearing before the Commission., 
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ASSIGNMENT V. SUMMARY 
It is our firm belief that the statutes, authorities and 
reasoning presented above clearly establish the following 
propositions: 
1. That Sec. 82~1~41 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
provides for a trial de novo of the rights involved in the 
hearing before the Securities Commission, and not a re~trial 
of the issues raised at that hearing, or a judicial review there~ 
of on the record as made, or as supplemented by a Court. 
2. That respondent's Complaint to the Court does not 
show that any of its rights were infringed or violated at said 
hearing, and, therefore, does not state a case for relief. 
3. That the Court had no jurisdiction to order a 
transcript for purposes of review, or to disturb the Order of 
the Commission without a hearing, on notice, first had. 
4. That the Court erred in ordering a transcript; in 
annulling the Commission's final Order; in refusing to grant 
appellants' Motion to vacate its own preliminary Order; in 
over~ruling appellants' Demurrer; and finally entering judg~ 
ment, setting aside and holding for naught the final Cancel~ 
lation Order of the Securities Commission. 
By reason of which appellants pray for a complete re--
versal of the Orders and Judgment of the Court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, Attorney General 
of the State of Utah. 
DELBERT M. DRAPER, 
Attorneys for Appellants & Defendants. 
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